In this paper, we propose a supply chain contract model aimed to coordinate a three-echelon supply chain, which is based on the\nrevenue-sharing allocation with loss-aversion preference. We consider a three-echelon supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral\nmanufacturer, a risk-neutral distributor, and loss-averse multiple retailers. To address this model, we consider a shortage product\nproduced and sold within a single period in the stochastic market. The model allows the system efficiency to be achieved as well as\nit will improve the profits of all supply chain members by tuning the contract parameters. We used the expected utility function to\ndescribe the loss-aversion memberâ??s influence coefficient. The decisions of chain members under different conditions are studied\nby simulation analyses. The paper also analysed the relationship between different revenue-sharing coefficient combinations with\nmultiple retailers in the supply chain system. Furthermore, the study has addressed the supply chain coordination decision bias in\nthe centralized and decentralized systems.
Loading....